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Abstract This paper analyses the relationship between competitive environment and
R&D cooperation with universities and competitors. Our simple model suggests that
cooperation creates benefits in terms of synergies but also induces costs due to spillovers.
Since the value of these synergies and spillovers depends on the competitive pressure,
cooperation propensity depends on the competitive environment. Differentiating between
the dimensions of competition, we hypothesize that university cooperation corresponds to
quality competition, while horizontal cooperation relates to price competition. Further-
more, we predict that a higher number of competitors reduces the incentives for horizontal
cooperation as it diminishes the gains from ‘‘collusion’’. We test these hypotheses using
Swiss firm-level panel data that allows us to control for simultaneity of cooperation
decisions and endogeneity of competition. Our empirical analysis supports the relevance of
distinguishing between competition dimensions and cooperation partners, respectively. We
find that price competition has an influence on university cooperation in the form of an
inverted U. Quality competition only has an influence on university cooperation and the
relationship shows a U-form. Moreover, we see that the number of principal competitors
reduces cooperation between competitors.
Keywords Innovation cooperation  University cooperation  Horizontal cooperation 
Number of competitors  Price competition  Quality competition
JEL Classification O3
T. Bolli
Economics Department, Lancaster University, Lancaster, LA1 4YX, UK
e-mail: bolli@alumni.ethz.ch
M. Woerter (&)
ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland
e-mail: woerter@kof.ethz.ch
123
J Technol Transf (2013) 38:768–787
DOI 10.1007/s10961-013-9302-2
1 Introduction
Despite the fact that both innovation policy and competition policy aim to increase pro-
ductivity by fostering technological change, they often seem to contradict each other
(Shapiro 2002). Intellectual property rights (IPR) are an important example. They increase
incentives for innovation but also create barriers to entry for potential competitors. Sim-
ilarly, allowing research and development (R&D) cooperation improves the innovation
process, but might also result in anticompetitive behaviour and coordination among market
players. Hence, innovation and competition policy are closely linked and influence each
other. Recognizing this overlap, the US considers applications for research joint ventures
more flexible in terms of antitrust concerns (see, e.g., Link et al. 2002, 2005).
Reflecting the disparity of these political questions, two largely independent strands of
literature have developed. The first analyzes the relationship between competition and
innovation (see, e.g., Schumpeter 1912, 1942; Arrow 1962; Aghion et al. 2005; Boone
2008a, b; Vives 2008). The second strand of literature investigates the determinants of
R&D cooperation and the choice of the R&D partner (see, e.g., Cohen and Levinthal 1989,
1990; Veugelers 1997; Veugelers and Cassiman 1999; Cassiman and Veugelers 2002,
2005; Beneito 2006). Relatively little, however, is known about the relationship between
the competitive environment and R&D cooperation. Hence, this paper provides a bridge
between these two related strands of literature.
The few papers that analyze the effect of market concentration on R&D cooperation
portray a mixed picture. While Herna´n et al. (2003), Beneito (2003), Negassi (2004) and
Ro¨ller et al. (2007) support an increasing relationship, Hayton et al. (2010) suggest a
decreasing effect. To our knowledge, the only paper that differentiates between price and
quality competition was written by Colombo et al. (2006), who do not find a significant
relationship between a direct measure of price competition intensity and technological
cooperation. Differentiating between cooperation partner types, Miotti and Sachwald
(2003) find no evidence of market share influencing cooperation propensity.
Similarly, the scant amount of literature that exists on the question of whether a small
number of market players results in collusion provides mixed evidence. While Oxley et al.
(2009), Clougherty and Duso (2009) and Tong and Reuer (2010) find evidence for collusion,
Woerter (2011) does not find a significant relationship between the number of principal
competitors and cooperation. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) however empirically
show a positive relationship between the number of competitors and cooperation.
This paper extends the existing literature along two main lines. First, we develop a
theoretical framework for the relationship between the competitive environment and R&D
cooperation. This framework refines previous work by differentiating between different
cooperation partners and different dimensions of the competitive environment. Secondly,
we test the resulting predictions empirically. Thereby we provide first empirical evidence
for the differential impact of several competition dimensions on cooperation across partner
types. In accordance with our theoretical framework, we further allow for nonlinearities of
the effect.
Starting with the observation that cooperation takes place if the benefit of cooperation
exceeds the cost of cooperation, our theoretical framework distinguishes three channels
through which the R&D cooperation affects profits. The main benefit, the synergy effect,
increases research productivity, e.g. by pooling complementary resources. The second
benefit, the collusion effect, occurs because R&D cooperation facilitates collusion between
rivals and thereby increases profits. However, the firm has to weigh these benefits against
the costs arising due to knowledge spillovers, which we refer to as the spillover effect.
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As R&D cooperation affects the benefits and costs of innovation, and competition
changes the value of innovation, competition affects the incentives to cooperate. The form
of the relationship between competition and cooperation depends on whether the synergy
effect or spillover effect dominates. Assuming an inverted U-shaped relationship between
competitive pressure and innovation value suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship
between competitive pressure and cooperation propensity if the synergy effect dominates.
Conversely, if the spillover effect prevails, we expect a U-shaped relationship.
Since the existing empirical evidence suggests that the nature of R&D projects in R&D
cooperation differs substantially between cooperation partner types (Miotti and Sachwald
2003; Belderbos et al. 2004; Aschhof and Schmidt 2008), we complete our model by
making according assumptions. Concretely we assume that university cooperation relates
to product innovation while horizontal cooperation corresponds to process innovation.
Though our framework extends to other types of cooperation partners as well, this paper
focuses on cooperation with universities and horizontal partners as the existing empirical
evidence provides little guidance in terms of the nature of R&D projects with other
cooperation partner types, suggesting that the nature of R&D projects with other coop-
eration partner types is more heterogeneous.
In order to account for these differences between the cooperation goals, we differentiate
two dimensions of competition intensity, namely price and quality competition. We further
assume that the spillover effect is stronger for product innovation than for process inno-
vation. Hence, we hypothesize that quality competitive pressure affects university coop-
eration in an inverted U-shape while price competitive pressure affects horizontal
cooperation in a U-form.
The third channel, the ability of a firm to collude with its competitors as well as the
benefits of collusion, depends on the market overview, suggesting a negative relationship
between the number of principal competitors and horizontal cooperation.
Our empirical findings are based on comprehensive firm-level panel data of Swiss R&D
active manufacturing firms (Swiss Innovation Survey). In line with the broad body of
existing literature, we confirm that R&D cooperation creates synergies, as our proxies for
incoming spillovers, absorptive capacity, and technological potential are positively related
to both types of cooperation partners, though accounting for potential endogeneity weakens
these results for horizontal cooperation.
Price competition intensity has an influence on university cooperation but not horizontal
cooperation, though only after accounting for potential endogeneity. The relationship takes
the form of an inverted U-shape, suggesting that the synergy effect dominates. The finding
further indicates that university cooperation yields synergies in respect to process inno-
vation. Furthermore we find a U-shaped relationship between quality competition and
university cooperation, suggesting that the existence of knowledge spillover is more
important than synergies. In line with our predictions, we do not find a relationship
between quality competition and horizontal cooperation. We also find evidence that the
value of collusion matters, since there is a decreasing relationship between the number of
principal competitors and the probability of cooperation among competitors. In sum the
results show that competition is significantly related to cooperation. Furthermore, the form
of the relationship depends on the type of competition (price, quality, number of com-
petitors) and on the type of partners.
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter two introduces our theoretical framework
and derives corresponding hypotheses. Chapter three discusses the data and the empirical
setup. Chapter four presents the results and chapter five concludes.
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2 Theoretical notions and hypotheses
Research cooperation takes place if it increases profits, i.e. if the benefits of cooperation
exceed the costs of cooperation. In our simple framework, cooperation affects firm profits
through three channels. The main benefit of cooperation is the improvement of innovation
productivity, which we label synergy effect. Cooperation further increases the value of
innovation through the collusion effect, i.e. by facilitating anticompetitive behaviour.
However, cooperation also creates knowledge spillovers, thereby reducing the value of
innovation. We refer to this channel as the spillover effect.
Hence, cooperation takes place if the benefits arising from the synergy and collusion
effect outweigh the costs due to the spillover effect. The following paragraphs deepen our
understanding of these relationships and derive hypotheses for the relationship between the
competitive environment and R&D cooperation.
We label the impact of cooperation on innovation productivity the synergy effect.
Kamien et al. (1992) argue that the synergy effect arises because innovation cooperation
eliminates wasteful duplication and hence increases research productivity. Similarly,
Glaister and Buckley (1996) argue that economies of scale and the transfer of comple-
mentary resources create synergies. The magnitude of the synergy effect depends on how
much knowledge spills over from the cooperation partner to the firm. Hence, the synergy
effect increases in incoming spillovers (Cassiman and Veugelers 2002). The magnitude
further depends on how well the firm can absorb and integrate the incoming knowledge
flows. Therefore, the synergy effect increases with the absorptive capacity of the firm
(Cohen and Levinthal 1989, 1990). Finally, the magnitude of the synergy effect depends on
the extent of knowledge that exists outside of the firm as this constitutes the maximum of
knowledge that can spill over from the cooperation partner to the firm. Hence, the synergy
effect increases in technological opportunity.
Hypothesis 1: Incoming spillovers, absorptive capacity and technological potential
increase the probability of R&D cooperation.
The synergy effect as defined so far does not create a relationship between the com-
petitive environment and cooperation. However, assuming that the value of enhancing
innovation depends on competition suggests a relationship between competition and
cooperation as well, since the benefits and costs of cooperation increases as the innovation
value rises. The existing literature suggests three potential relationships between compe-
tition and innovation value. First, Schumpeter (1912, 1942) argued that competition
decreases the expected profits reaped from innovating and hence reduces the incentives to
invest in R&D. Secondly, Arrow (1962) suggests a positive relationship between com-
petition and innovation due to the replacement effect, i.e. that firms in concentrated
markets may refrain from introducing new innovative products since (great) parts of the
revenues of older product would just be shifted to the new, innovative product. Techno-
logical lock-in effects further compound the opportunity cost of innovation and make it
unlikely that a firm in a highly concentrated market switches to a new technology in order
to substitute the old product (Geroski 1990). Thirdly, combining the arguments of
Schumpeter and Arrow, Gilbert (2006) suggests that moderate levels of competition are
most conducive to innovation, while very low or very high levels of competition reduce the
incentives to innovate. Empirical tests confirm the inverted U-shaped relationship between
innovation and competition (see, e.g., Levin et al. 1985; Aghion et al. 2005). Hence, we
assume that competition and innovation value are inverted U-shape related. Based on these
results, i.e. that the probability of cooperation increases as the value of the synergies it
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creates rises, and that the value of innovation and synergies follows an inverted U-shaped
relationship with competition, we can see that the synergy effect suggests that competition
increases the incentives for cooperation at low levels of competition but decreases the
incentives for cooperation at high levels of competition.
However, the synergy effect is counterbalanced by the spillover effect, which arises
because cooperation increases outgoing spillovers and thereby enhances competition.1
These effects can be indirect, e.g. in the case of universities, where the knowledge acquired
by the university in the course of a cooperation is spread to the wider economy through
technology transfer activities with other cooperation partners (see, e.g., Hall et al. 2001;
Jirjahn and Kraft 2011). The spillover effect resembles the synergy effect in the sense that
the relationship between competition and cooperation depends on the relationship between
the value of innovation and competition. Assuming (again) an inverted U-shape rela-
tionship between the value of innovation and competition, we can see that the value of
spillovers also increases with low levels of competition and decreases with high levels of
competition. Since spillovers are lowering profits, it is clear that competition decreases the
incentives for cooperation at low levels of competition but increases the incentives for
cooperation at high levels of competition. Hence we can see a U-shaped relationship
between cooperation and competition when referring to spillovers.
Since the synergy effect and the spillover effect suggest a converse relationship between
cooperation and competition, the predicted form of the relationship depends upon whether
the spillover effect or the synergy effect prevails. If the synergy effect dominates, we expect
an inverse U-shaped relationship. If the spillover effect prevails, we see a U-shaped
relationship between competition and cooperation.
In this paper, we focus on two types of cooperation partners, namely cooperation with
universities and horizontal cooperation with competitors. The existing empirical evidence
suggests that the nature of R&D cooperation projects differs between these cooperation
partners. Concretely, it suggests that cooperation agreements with universities focus on
basic research projects (Hall et al. 2001, 2003, Medda et al. 2005), leading to product
innovation (Miotti and Sachwald 2003; Belderbos et al. 2004; Aschhof and Schmidt 2008).
Beise and Stahl (1999) also confirm that academic research has a greater impact on product
innovation than on process innovation. Horizontal cooperation on the other hand stimulates
productivity but doesn’t necessarily induce product innovation (Miotti and Sachwald 2003;
Belderbos et al. 2004; Aschhof and Schmidt 2008). Similarly, Jirjahn and Kraft (2011)
show that horizontal cooperation increases incremental innovations but has no influence on
drastic innovations, while the opposite holds for university cooperation. These empirical
findings suggest that university cooperation projects aim at product innovation, while
horizontal cooperation projects aim at process innovation.
Furthermore, we learn from the findings of Ornaghi (2006) that the spillover effect is
stronger in the case of product innovation than in the case of process innovation. The main
explanation for this empirically sound result is that product innovation, once commer-
cialised, can be relatively easily copied, e.g., through reverse engineering, while copying
new processes is much more difficult. The later would require a kind of industrial espio-
nage in order to copy the new, innovative production process. Given the fact that coop-
eration with universities mainly focuses on product innovation and that the spillovers are
stronger for product innovations we would assume that the spillover effect dominates the
1 Bloom et al. 2010 distinguish between a technology spillover effect and a measure of product market
closeness. In our setting technology spillovers are referred to as synergy effect and product market closeness
is related to our measure of spillovers.
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synergy effect for university cooperation and that the synergy effect dominates the spillover
effect in the case of horizontal cooperation. Moreover, we know from the empirical lit-
erature on the dynamics of product and process innovation (see Utterback and Abernathy
1975; Adner and Levinthal 2001) that process innovation aiming at lowering production
costs is positively related to price competition, while product innovation aiming at
exploring new markets or enhancing existing markets is positively related to quality
competition (e.g., product differentiation).
Bringing together the above mentioned facts, namely that university cooperation mainly
aims at product innovations, in which spillovers and quality competition dominate, and that
horizontal cooperation has a stronger focus on process innovations, in which synergies and
price competition dominate, we state the following hypotheses:
(2a) Price competition doesn’t affect university cooperation
(2b) Price competition affects horizontal cooperation in the form of an inverted U since
the synergy effect prevails
(3a) Quality competition affects university cooperation in the form of a U-form since the
spillover effect prevails
(3b) Quality competition doesn’t affect horizontal cooperation
Hypotheses 2 and 3 have never been tested empirically. The scant empirical literature
there is focuses on market concentration as a measure of competition and hence fails to
distinguish between the type of cooperation partner and the potential non-linearity of the
effect. Therefore it provides little guidance in respect to our hypotheses 2 and 3. Con-
cretely, Herna´n et al. (2003), Ro¨ller et al. (2007), Negassi (2004) and Beneito (2003)
support the hypothesis that cooperation increases as markets become more concentrated,
while Hayton et al. (2010) find a negative relationship between market concentration and
cooperation. To our knowledge, the only paper that differentiates between price and quality
competition was written by Colombo et al. (2006), who do not find a significant rela-
tionship between a direct measure of price competition intensity and technological
cooperation. The only paper that differentiates between different types of cooperation
partners finds no impact of market concentration on university, horizontal and vertical
cooperation propensity (Miotti and Sachwald 2003).
The last channel through which the competitive environment affects cooperation, the
collusion effect, increases price–cost margin and hence profit. It occurs because horizontal
cooperation reduces the number of effective competitors and hence competitive pressure.
The collusion effect is strongest for a duopoly and decreases as competition intensifies, as
shown empirically by Oxley et al. (2009) and Tong and Reuer (2010). Hence, the value of
such a colluding R&D cooperation decreases with the number of principal competitors,
suggesting the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: (a) The number of principal competitors has no impact on university
cooperation
(b) The number of principal competitors reduces horizontal cooperation
However, while Clougherty and Duso (2009) find evidence of the collusion effect, they
show no differences of this effect across market concentration. Furthermore, Woerter
(2011) does not find a significant relationship between the number of principal competitors
and cooperation. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) however argue that the value of cost
and risk sharing increases when there is competition and empirically demonstrate a
positive relationship between the number of competitors and cooperation. Hence, the
existing empirical evidence provides mixed expectations for hypothesis 4b.
Competition and R&D cooperation 773
123
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Data
We use a panel of Swiss firms observed across five periods (1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, and
2008). The Swiss Economic Institute (KOF) at ETH Zurich collected the data through five
postal surveys, using a questionnaire similar to the ‘‘Community Innovation Survey’’
(available from www.kof.ethz.ch2).3 The data includes information on firm characteristics,
innovation activities and R&D activities, among other things. The surveys are based on a
stratified random sample of firms that have at least five employees and cover all relevant
industries in the manufacturing, construction, and service sectors. The sample employed
includes only R&D active manufacturing firms, thereby ensuring sample homogeneity and
hence internal validity. Dropping observations with missing values yields a highly unbal-
anced firm-panel with 3,057 observations.
3.2 Empirical setting
The empirical estimation consists of four equations with binary dependent variables, which
indicate whether a firm has conducted innovation cooperation with a particular partner type
within the previous three years (COOPu, COOPh, COOPv, COOPg). Subscripts k = {u, h,
v, g} denote coefficients of the estimation with university, horizontal, vertical and com-
pany group internal (or concern internal) cooperation as dependent variable, respectively:
prob COOPk;i;t ¼ 1jCOOPk;i;t;
  ¼ prob

bk;0 þ bk;t þ bk;j þ bk;1SPILLINCi;t1:
þ bk;2ABSCAPi;t1 þ bk;3TECHPOTi;t þ bk;4APPROPi;t1 þ
X
h
bhk;5QUALCOMP
h
i;t1
þ
X
h
bhk;6PRICECOMP
h
i;t1 þ bk;7COMPETITORSi;t1 þ bk;8Controli;t1 þ ek;i;t  0

ð5Þ
where i refers to firm, j to industry (two-digit level) and t to time. h = {1, 2} describes the
quadratic polynomial of variables measuring quality and price competition intensity. In
order to account for interdependence between cooperation choices, we estimate the
equation system described by Eq. 5 using a multivariate probit model, i.e. a SUR model
with binary dependent variables. Assuming a multivariate normal distribution of the robust
2 Questionnaires are available in German, Italian, and French.
3 The KOF (Swiss Economic Institute; www.kof.ethz.ch) at ETH Zurich is specialized in collecting firm-
level survey data. Data collection takes place following very strict guidelines. All waves of the surveys are
conducted based on the same firm panel (stratified sample (2-digit sectors, 3 firm-size classes, with full
coverage of the upper class of firms) of around 6,600 firms. The number of observations (response rates) is
1,748 firms (32.5%), 2,172 firms (33.8%), 2,583 firms (39.6%), 2,555 firms (38.7%), and 2,141 firms
(36.1%) for the years 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005 and 2008, respectively. The firm directory is regularly
updated. There are strict rules for handling firms that don’t answer. Every survey is accompanied by an
intensive recall action conducted by trained staff. The recall action should guarantee an equilibrated
response rate across the statistical cells (sector/firm size). Every returned questionnaire is manually checked
by a researcher for consistency. The researcher calls the firm if inconsistent answers are detected. The
regular survey is followed by a non-response survey in order to detect a possible non-response bias for key
questions. Based on the mail that is returned unanswered we can detect which firms have exited the market.
Exiting firms are substituted by (statistically) similar firms.
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error terms clustered at firm level, eu,eh, ev and eg, we estimate the system by simulated
maximum likelihood with 400 draws (see, e.g., Greene 2003, p. 710).
The vector of independent variables follows our theoretical framework as well as the
empirical model specification of Cassiman and Veugelers (2002). Table 1 provides details
about the construction of variables. Tables 3 and 4 in the appendix display summary
statistics and pair-wise correlations of the employed variables.
We measure the relevance of spillovers (SPILLINC) as the average importance of
several information sources, including universities, horizontal, vertical and company group
internal (or concern internal) information sources. The share of R&D employees captures
absorptive capacity (ABSCAP). The data further allows us to control for technological
potential outside of the firm (TECHPOT).4 The inverse of the innovation obstacle ‘‘easi-
ness to copy’’ approximates appropriability (APPROP), since we assume that appropri-
ability is low if competitors can easily copy innovation results and vice versa.
Following Belderbos et al. (2004), we include the relevance of the innovation obstacle ‘‘high
costs’’ in the control vector. This cost variable (OCOST) refers to the costs of innovation
activities. Hence, OCOST captures the Schumpeterian idea (Schumpeter 1942) that innovation
activities require substantial financial resources. Finally, we control for firm size measured by
the number of full-time employees (SIZE) and its square (SIZE^2), whether a firm is foreign-
owned (FOREIGN), whether the firm is an exporter (EXPORTER) as well as time and industry
dummies. Including these variables has shown to be empirically relevant for small open
economies, like Switzerland (see, e.g., Arvanitis et al. 2008; Arvanitis and Stucki 2012) Fur-
thermore we control for industry fixed effects (two-digit level) and time fixed effects.
Due to the multifaceted nature of the competition concept, the existing literature
remains divided on the question of how to measure competition (see, e.g., Boone 2008a, b;
Vives 2008). In this paper, we use subjective evaluations of the firms themselves to
measure competition. Using these firm-specific evaluations has the advantage that it allows
us to differentiate between different dimensions of competition (price competition, quality
competition, number of principal competitors). Furthermore, our competition measures are
not limited to the domestic market but take into account the worldwide markets, a feature
which is of great importance for a small, technologically advanced country like Switzer-
land. Finally, these competition measures take into account the distinct characteristics of
the firms’ market, which is particularly relevant in the case of Swiss firms as they often
produce for a small market niche that can hardly be proxied by competition measures
referring to broad industry classifications. However, the subjectivity of the response makes
our results vulnerable to potential biases in the evaluation of competition. In order to
address this criticism, we also calculate our measures of competition by taking the average
of the competition measure of firms in the two-digit industry.5
Concretely, we include linear and quadratic terms of two types of competition
dimensions, namely the intensity of price and quality competition (PRICECOMP,
PRICECOMP_SQU, QUALCOMP, QUALCOMP_SQU) measured on a five point Likert
scale (1 very weak… 5 very strong). Furthermore, we can identify the number of principal
competitors according to five categories, namely 0–5, 6–10, 11–15, 16–50 and more than
50 principal competitors (NCOMP).6
4 Technological potential is defined as the globally available private and public knowledge that might be
useful for the creation of new products and services based on the applied technology. Firms were asked in a
questionnaire to evaluate the technological potential on a five point Likert scale (1 very low… 5 very high).
5 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this point.
6 The five categories are given in the questionnaire.
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We address potential problems of endogeneity and measurement error (see, e.g., Gilbert
2006) by instrumenting the number of principal competitors (NCOMP), price competition
intensity (PRICECOMP), quality competition intensity (QUALCOMP) and technological
potential (TECHPOT) based on the lagged industry averages.7
Table 1 Variable definitions
Name Definition Expected effect
COOP
UNI
COOP
HOR
Dependent
variables
COOP UNI Binary variable whether a firm has worked in R&D cooperation with
universities or other research institutions in the last 3 years (yes/no)
COOP HOR Binary variable whether a firm has worked in R&D cooperation with
competitors in the last 3 years (yes/no)
COOP VERT Binary variable whether a firm has worked in R&D cooperation with
suppliers or customers in the last 3 years (yes/no)
COOP
GROUP
Binary variable whether a firm has worked in R&D cooperation with
other firms in the same company group (in the same concern) in the last
3 years (yes/no)
Explanatory
variables
PRICECOMP Category of price competition intensity on a five point Likert scale
(1 very weak … 5 very strong)
0 \
QUALCOMP Category of non-price, or quality competition intensity on a five point
Likert scale (1 very weak … 5 very strong)
U 0
NCOMP Category of number of principal competitors between 1 and 5 (0–5,
6–10, 11–15, 16–50, 50 ? competitors)
0 –
SPILLINC Incoming spillovers, calculated as the average relevance of universities,
other research institutions, competitors, suppliers, customers and firm
groups as a source of information for the R&D activity on a five point
Likert scale (1 none … 5 very important)
? ?
ABSCAP Absorptive capacity, measured by the share of R&D employees ? ?
TECHPOT Technological potential outside the firm on a five point Likert scale
(1 very low … 5 very high)
? ?
APPROP Appropriability, measured by six minus the relevance of the innovation
obstacle ‘‘easiness to copy’’ on a five point Likert scale (1 none…5 crucial)
? ?
OCOST Binary variable that is 1 if the relevance of the innovation obstacle ‘‘high
costs’’ scores 4 or 5 on a five point Likert scale (1 none … 5 crucial),
and 0 otherwise
SIZE Number of full time employees
EXPORTER Binary variable that takes the value 1 if the firm exports abroad,
and 0 otherwise
FOREIGN Binary variable that is 1 if the majority of the firm is foreign-owned,
and 0 otherwise
U and \ mean a U-shaped and inverse U-shaped relationship, respectively
? and - denote significant positive and significant negative relationship, respectively; 0 means no relationship
7 We manually implement the IV estimator, i.e. estimate the first stage using OLS and include the predicted
values for both linear and quadratic terms in the second stage multivariate probit estimations.
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Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses. Incoming spillovers, absorptive capacity, tech-
nological potential and appropriability should be positively related to both types of
cooperation. Quality competition relates to university cooperation but has no impact on
horizontal cooperation. Conversely, price competition is expected to affect horizontal
cooperation only. The number of principal competitors should be negatively related to
horizontal cooperation.
4 Results
Table 2 displays multivariate probit models for university, horizontal, vertical and com-
pany group internal (or concern internal) cooperation. Columns 1 to 4 use contemporary
values of regressors. Columns 5 to 8 use lagged regressors by 3 years (the surveys are
conducted every 3 years) and use industry averages of competition measures and tech-
nological potential to account for potential endogeneity, reverse causality and measure-
ment error. Columns 9 to 12 also use lagged regressors, instrument competition measures
and technological potential by their corresponding industry averages formally. Table 6 in
the appendix demonstrates that instruments display a significant predictive power in the
first stage.
Table 2 shows that SPILLINC, ABSCAP, and TECHPOT are positively related to
university cooperation, suggesting the presence of synergies and hence supporting
hypothesis 1. The evidence remains more ambiguous regarding horizontal cooperation.
Concretely, while the contemporary estimates suggest a positive effect of technological
potential and incoming spillovers, accounting for potential reverse causality renders these
indicators of synergies insignificant. Furthermore, we see a positive effect of appropri-
ability (APPROP) on university cooperation in the contemporary estimations that disap-
pears when using lagged values of the variable. Similarly, we find no evidence for an
impact of appropriability on the propensity to cooperate with horizontal partners.
Hypothesis 2a predicts that price competition (PRICECOMP) and university coopera-
tion are unrelated, while hypothesis 2b predicts a significant relationship between price
competition and horizontal cooperation. Rather surprisingly, simple correlations only
support hypothesis 2a as price competition intensity affects neither university nor hori-
zontal cooperation significantly in the base estimation (columns 1 and 2; Table 2).
However, instrumenting price competition yields an inverse U-shaped relationship
between price competition and university cooperation, suggesting that the synergy effect
dominates the spillover effect in the relationship. This finding further suggests that uni-
versity cooperation leads to synergies in respect to process innovation.
Hypothesis 3a suggests that quality competition (QUALCOMP) and university
cooperation have a significant U-shaped relationship. Hypothesis 3b claims that quality
competition has no impact on horizontal cooperation. Table 2 supports these hypotheses,
as we find a U-shaped relationship between quality competition and university cooper-
ation and no correlation between quality competition and horizontal cooperation. Hence,
we see that the spillover effect outpaces the synergy effect in the case of quality
competition.
Quality competition shows a U-shaped relationship with university cooperation, while
the functional form follows an inverted U-shape in the case of price competition. This
difference between the two competition types suggests that appropriability and hence the
spillover effect matters more for product innovation than for process innovation, which is
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consistent with the differences in the significance of appropriability in the non-instru-
mented university and horizontal cooperation equations.
Confirming both hypotheses 4a and 4b, Table 2 further reveals that the number of
competitors (NCOMP) decreases horizontal cooperation but has no effect on university
cooperation.
Furthermore, our results show that financial constraints, measured by OCOST, are
related to the probability of university cooperation, though the effect disappears in the
more sophisticated estimations. OCOST is not significantly related to horizontal cooper-
ation. This finding implies that the cost-sharing motive might apply to university coop-
eration, while alternative reasons motivate horizontal cooperation.
We further control for firm size (SIZE, SIZE^2), exporter status (EXPORTER), foreign
ownership (FOREIGN), time fixed effects and industry fixed effects. Firm size relation to
both types of cooperation follows a U-shape. Exporter status relates positively to university
cooperation but not to horizontal cooperation. Foreign ownership is unrelated to cooper-
ation with both partner types.
Table 2 further allows us to assess the nature of vertical and company group internal
cooperation. Vertical cooperation behaves somewhat similar to university cooperation in
respect to competition. Concretely, it remains unaffected by the number of competitors, but
displays some indication of a U-shaped pattern for quality competition. It however remains
unaffected by price competition. Furthermore, the relevance of spillovers and absorptive
capacity increases vertical cooperation. Appropriability, however, does not affect coop-
eration with vertical partners. Furthermore, financial constraints (OCOST) do not matter,
suggesting that the ability of universities to overcome financial constraints does not extend
to vertical cooperation partners.
Company group internal cooperation is unaffected by our competition measures. Fur-
thermore, we do not find evidence for a spillover effect as appropriability remains insig-
nificant. However, the significance of the relevance of spillovers, absorptive capacity and
technological potential suggests the presence of a synergy effect.
5 Conclusions
The investigation at hand looks at the meaning of competition for the choice of cooperation
partners distinguishing between two types of cooperation partner, i.e. universities and
horizontal partners. Thereby we are contributing to two strands of literature: First, we
extend the literature addressing the relationship between the competitive environment and
decisions related to R&D and innovation (see, e.g., Schumpeter 1912, 1942, Arrow 1962,
Aghion et al. 2005, Boone 2008a, b and Vives 2008). We do so by clarifying and analyzing
the particular forces that relate the competitive environment to R&D cooperation. Sec-
ondly, we extend the, investigations that look at the determinants of innovation cooperation
and the choice of partners by showing that different dimensions of the competitive envi-
ronment differ in their effect on the propensity to cooperate with universities and hori-
zontal firms (e.g. Veugelers 1997; Cassiman and Veugelers 2002, 2005; Herna´n et al. 2003;
Beneito 2003; Negassi 2004).
Our simple theoretical framework distinguishes three channels through which compe-
tition affects innovation cooperation. First, the synergy effect arises because the value of
innovation synergies changes as competition intensifies. Secondly, the changing value of
innovation spillovers (spillover effect) affects the costs of cooperation. Thirdly, the value
of collusion (collusion effect) increases in market overview.
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Using Swiss firm level data, we confirm our assumptions that university cooperation but
not horizontal cooperation corresponds to quality competition and hence product innova-
tion. In addition, university cooperation responds to price competition after instrumen-
talisation, suggesting that universities provide synergies in respect to process innovation.
Furthermore, our results support the hypothesis of a collusion effect as horizontal coop-
eration decreases with the number of principal competitors.
An interpretation of our results in terms of competition emphasises two points.
First, competition plays a different role for horizontal and university cooperation,
respectively. We do not see any effect of appropriability or quality competition for
horizontal cooperation, which indicates that other factors drive firms to collaborate with
competitors. In fact, it is the number of principal competitors that provides incentives
for horizontal cooperation. Thus, market overview seems to be more important than
synergies in innovation activities. In contrast, the number of principal competitors is
not important for cooperation with universities. Here, both price and quality competi-
tion are important driving forces. Firms try to realize synergies in innovation activities
and they take care of outgoing spillovers that might increase product market
competition.
Secondly, our results suggest that innovation policy and competition policy are related
(see Teece 1992). R&D cooperation is intended to improve the innovation performance
of firms. We found that quality competition is U-shape related with university collab-
orations and unrelated with horizontal cooperation. Based on these results one can
suggest that, if competition policy emphasises the number of principal competitors as an
important criteria, competition policy discourages R&D cooperation with competitors.
Regarding R&D cooperation with universities and price competition, our results suggest
that competition authorities should aim to create a medium level of competitive pressure
in order to optimize R&D cooperation and innovation. The inverse holds true for quality
competition. R&D cooperation is high for low and high levels of quality competition
while medium levels of quality competition discourage cooperation with universities.
Since this suggests that spillovers are particularly relevant for product innovations,
intellectual property rights (IPR) might serve as a bridge between competition policy and
innovation policy. Concretely, a medium level of quality competition can be avoided by
ensuring a highly competitive market that is also characterized by temporary monopolies
granted by IPR. Hence, competition policy aligns well with innovation policy if it aims
at medium levels of price competition and either low or high levels of product
competition.
While our data allows distinguishing between cooperation partner type and compe-
tition dimension, we have no direct information regarding the concrete nature of the
cooperation projects, forcing us to make indirect inference. Looking more deeply into
this ‘black box’ of cooperation projects is an important research direction that this paper
points to. Moreover it would be interesting to see if the results for Switzerland also hold
true for countries with different industry structures or larger domestic markets. It is
likely that the size of the home market influences the significance of competition for
firm/university cooperation; a more intense quality competition in the domestic market
might increase the sensitivity of firms for potential spillovers. Finally, while the
availability of panel data allows us to tackle potential endogeneity, the empirical
strategy is not based on a natural experiment and therefore some doubts in respect to
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the causal interpretation of our results remain. Future research should therefore confirm
this claim.
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Appendix
See Tables 3, 4, 5, 6.
Table 3 Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
COOP UNI 3,057 0.27 0.45 0 1
COOP HOR 3,057 0.13 0.33 0 1
COOP VERT 3,057 0.35 0.48 0 1
COOP GROUP 3,057 0.17 0.38 0 1
NCOMP 3,057 2.37 1.30 1 5
PRICECOMP 3,057 4.02 0.96 1 5
QUALCOMP 3,057 3.35 0.92 1 5
SPILLINC 3,057 2.77 0.64 1 4.81
ABSCAP 3,057 8.95 10.69 0 100
TECHPOT 3,057 3.13 1.05 1 5
APPROP 3,057 3.44 1.19 1 5
OCOST 3,057 0.43 0.50 0 1
SIZE* 3,057 271.96 943.06 1 21,000
EXPORTER 3,057 45.46 37.05 0 100
FOREIGN 3,057 0.18 0.38 0 1
FIRM AGE 2,994 65.48 43.45 2 648
* The sample is based on firms with more than 5 employees. However, at the time the survey was conducted
the number of employees of some of the firms dropped below 5
Table 4 Pairwise correlation coefficients
COOP
UNI
COOP
HOR
COOP
VERT
COOP
GROUP
NCOMP PRICECOMP QUALCOMP
COOP UNI 1.00
COOP HOR 0.34 1.00
COOP VERT 0.68 0.42 1.00
COOP GROUP 0.47 0.28 0.51 1.00
NCOMP -0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 1.00
PRICECOMP 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.14 1.00
QUALCOMP 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.01 1
SPILLINC 0.22 0.09 0.15 0.23 -0.01 0.11 0.1519
ABSCAP 0.16 0.03 0.11 0.09 -0.09 -0.08 0.0607
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Table 4 continued
COOP
UNI
COOP
HOR
COOP
VERT
COOP
GROUP
NCOMP PRICECOMP QUALCOMP
TECHPOT 0.24 0.10 0.20 0.15 -0.02 0.04 0.1224
APPROP 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.0229
OCOST 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.0313
SIZE 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.17 -0.01 0.05 0.0764
EXPORTER 0.24 0.01 0.20 0.20 -0.21 -0.01 0.084
FOREIGN 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.18 -0.13 -0.02 0.0661
SPILLINC ABSCAP TECHPOT APPROP OCOST SIZE EXPORTER
SPILLINC 1.00
ABSCAP -0.01 1.00
TECHPOT 0.31 0.15 1.00
APPROP -0.15 0.10 0.02 1.00
OCOST 0.12 0.04 0.13 -0.21 1.00
SIZE 0.1287 0.0628 0.1412 0.0167 0.022 1
EXPORTER 0.125 0.248 0.2185 0.084 -0.0145 0.1042 1
FOREIGN 0.1449 0.0696 0.0538 0.0494 -0.0347 -0.0014 0.2164
Table 5 Sample distribution across industries and size classes
Industry/employees 0–49 50–249 250?
Food (1) 63 104 76
Textile (2) 35 48 13
Wood (4) 44 36 5
Paper (5) 18 22 29
Printing (6) 31 52 15
Chemicals (7) 104 100 55
Plastics/rubber (8) 44 79 22
Non-metallic minerals (9) 35 41 20
Basic metals (10) 6 28 20
Fabricated metals (11) 126 177 47
Machinery (12) 206 301 149
Electrical equipment (13) 54 68 66
Eletronic/optical products (14) 161 184 84
Watches (15) 27 48 17
Vehicles (16) 12 24 16
Other manufacturing (17) 40 61 14
Energy (18) 2 10 18
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